Regulating Labour Relations in China :
The China's transition to a socialist market economy has brought on new challenges for labour relations. No longer is economic production the province of a comprehensive state bureaucratic administration. Rather the economy is increasingly dominated by an ever-expanding number of private and quasi-private actors, which pose new challenges for doctrines of labour control articulated by the Communist Party of China (CPC) and enforced through the state labour bureaucracy. On one hand the ideological justifications no longer exist for strict labour discipline, politically subservient labour unions, the absence of collective bargaining and denial of the right to strike. On the other hand, China's economic development (and continued political stability) require a tightly controlled labour force, even as the demands of efficiency restrict investment in working conditions and benefits. China's first comprehensive labour law went into effect on January 1, 1995, and represents the regime's most recent efforts to grapple with prob-
Foundations for PRC Labour Policy
The Labour Law of the PRC reflects current policy priorities of the Chinese government, but these operate in the context of the Party's historical relations with urban workers. During the pre-Liberation period, the CPC's problematic attempts to mobilize urban workers into a revolutionary force contributed to labour policies that placed a premium on political control. During the Maoist period, the ideological conceit that China was a workers' state led to policies of material coaptation of workers, but accomnanied Kv the nrice of pontinueH Hisciplin^ and contrnl.
Revolutionary Relations Between Cadres and Urban Workers
During the revolutionary period prior to 1949, the CPC had a conflictive relationship with urban workers. Initial successes at labour organizing in the southern cities of Guangzhou and Shanghai in the 1920s were met with vigorous counter-measures by the Nationalist Party (KMT) leadership and local capitalists 2 . In Guangzhou, despite sporadic strikes and labour unrest the Communist Party had difficulty consolidating its gains and mobilizing workers to accomplish its revolutionary goals. In Shanghai, the first United Front brought tentative successes, as the Party used strikes and labour organization efforts to strengthen its position, only to see these efforts wiped out by the Nationalist coup in 1927 3 . In the North, the CPC faced similar problems. Despite active labour organizing work in the northern 1. For an authoritative review of the Labour Law of the PRC that reviews the law's efforts to re-order labour relations in light of changing conditions of China's socialist market economy, see Guo Xiang, «Laodong fa : Weihu zhigong hefa quanyi de jiben fa» (The Labour Law : A basic law for protecting the lawful rights of staff and workers), in cities and along the major railroad lines, the Party was generally unable to translate these efforts into successful political revolution 4 . These failures contributed to policies toward urban workers which, on the one hand saw labour organizing as a basis for revolution, and yet on the other remained circumspect about the practical potential of such efforts.
The regulatory frameworks erected by the CPC in its revolutionary base areas reflected this ambivalence. In the Jiangxi Soviet for example, the enactment of a labour law based on the Soviet Model gave vent to two policy aims : improving conditions and establishing trade unions as the focus of the CPC s Party-building efforts, to ensure that the workers' movement remained subservient to the Party's revolutionary programme 5 . In the northern base areas, labour regulations were used in a similar way to articulate policies of improving labour conditions while ensuring disciplined compliance by workers to CPC policy directives through the labour union system 6 . Party doubts about the reliability of workers as political allies were brought home during the campaign to retake Manchuria after 1945, where concerns about worker support contributed to the Party Centre's decision to build rural base areas and in effect abandon the cities 7 .
Thus, during the pre-Liberation period, the CPC s experience with difficulties in developing the revolutionary consciousness of Chinese workers and bending them to the political needs of the Party had a significant influence of the Party's labour policies. As well, the gradual displacement of the urban leadership of the CPC and the emergence of Mao Zedong led to further disregard of urban issues generally and an ambivalence toward urban workers. By the time the CPC gained control of the entirety of China, a pattern of labour policy was well established that emphasized political control over worker organizations-control that was mandated in no small part by doubts about the political reliability of the urban proletariat. During periods of more formal regulation (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) , for example), reliance was placed on the « labour contract system ». At that time, China's economy was characterized as undergoing the transition from the private to the public ownership, and the labour contract system was considered a useful mechanism for bringing labour relations in private ownership enterprises within the ambit of Party control. The Party-organized trade unions played a central role in setting the terms of collective labour contracts in particular, by which terms and conditions of employment were set for an entire enterprise. . This regulatory structure was aimed at ensuring improved conditions for labour, and also Party control of workers through the medium of trade unions.
With the completion of Socialist Transformation, and particularly during the period 1958-1962, labour policy was the province of flexible Party directives. Workers were viewed as members of a collectivist organism in which there was little need for formal regulations. Informal policy edicts and administrative directives were sufficient. During these periods, labour policy presumed that workers were the masters of the enterprises under the ideology of socialist public ownership and there were no longer any basic conflicts of interests between workers, enterprises and the state. The labour contract system was considered a vestige of capitalist private ownership, and so was abolished 13 . The importance of political control over workers remained, however, and during the Cultural Revolution competing factions issued conflicting rules on worker participation in the movement 14 .
Chinese labour policies were articulated in several constitutions enacted between 1954 and 1982. The 1954 Constitution articulated worker rights to employment, improved working conditions and wages, rest (xiuxi), sick and retirement pay and other benefits 15 . The so-called « Cultural Revolution» Constitution of 1975 enshrined a right to strike without making reference to labour discipline, while the 1978 Constitution reflected the post-Mao reversals of radical policies and added provisions on labour discipline 16 . The 1982 Constitution deleted the right to strike altogether 17 .
These varying approaches to labour relations reflected conclusions about class struggle held by contending elements of the CPC elite 18 . At one end of the spectrum were views associated with Liu Shaoqi and Peng Zhen, who had concluded as early as 1956 that class struggle was no longer a problem and the emphasis should shift to developing China's productive forces-entailing greater emphasis on labour discipline. Radical views associated with Mao Zedong on the other hand held that class struggle would continue for a long time and insisted that worker rights be given priority over obligations concerning labour discipline and productivity. Despite these differences however, the theme of political domination continued, and resulted in what has been termed a neo-Confucian relationship of patronage and control between workers and unit leaders 19 .
Transition to a Market Economy
China's transition to a socialist market economy is ongoing and likely will continue to evolve significantly in the future. During the first fifteen or so years of reform, three distinct phases can be identified : (i) an initial phase of market liberalization, (H) an acceleration phase during which price reforms were central, and (iii) a privatization phase during which the role of state enterprises has been transformed dramatically.
Initial Efforts at Reform
The economic reform programs initiated following the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in 1978 were tentative at first, but soon moved beyond the confines of either the Maoist or Soviet models that had influenced China previously 20 . Key to this was the political re-emergence of those who emphasized the decline of class struggle and the need to focus on productive forces 21 . For with the end of class struggle, the Party/state need no longer concern itself with resolving the problem of exploitation, and could recognize greater degrees of autonomy by individuals and groups in the economy. Thus contracts, business firms, and labour relations all could be directed not by the Party/state charged with eliminating and avoiding class exploitation, but rather by autonomous actors increasingly freed of state intrusion.
These ideological changes and their policy implications emerged slowly at first. In labour relations, for example, little attention was paid to reforming the state enterprise labour system initially. Instead, the emphasis was placed on reforming enterprise management. Reforms in state planning permitted enterprises managers to contract with a wider variety of business partners, while the two-track pricing system permitted managers greater 23 . Thus the initial policy focus was on increasing the efficiency and productivity of state enterprises, with little attention paid to reforming relations between state enterprises and their workers. In labour relations, the neo-Confucian patrimonial relationship continued.
However, in an effort to address the employment problem for an increasing number of migrant workers-primarily young people seeking work outside their assigned residence (hukou) location (often these were Cultural Revolution youth who were returning to the cities after having been sent down to rural areas, or peasants seeking escape from the drudgery of village life), the government enacted rules on contract labour. The 1986 Regulations on Administraiion of Labour Contracts by State Enterprises permitted state enterprises to hire occasional workers without actually incorporating them into the enterprise work unit and providing the standard array of accompanying benefits 24 . The labour contracts executed under these rules were generally not available to workers already formally assigned to the enterprise, and in view of the lower level of benefits available under them were not considered desirable.
Even though labour contracts formed pursuant to the 1986 Regulations were essentially « gap-fillers » for workers who were not already part of state enterprise system, the new measures did encourage the gradual emergence of a somewhat free labour market 25 . Even as unskilled workers began to do contract labour in areas of construction and goods transport-to the extent of reducing the staff needs and costs of state enterprises, skilled workers began to find ways to secure their release from former employers to gain more remunerative employment. This was, despite the resistance of state enterprise employers who were often unwilling to freely release their skilled workers to seek higher paid employment. began to spring up which would serve as « headhunters » for firms seeking to hire skilled workers and professionals and arrange payment of the release fee demanded by state enterprises as the price of releasing their staff members to other units. As well, the sidewalk labour markets became an increasingly important source of unskilled workers being hired for shortterm projects. In sum, the initial reforms culminated in the emergence of a proto-market for labour.
Accelerated Reform
By the late 1980s, many of the initial reforms had run their course. Enterprise managers were increasingly independent, production inputs and outputs were gradually being freed of state regulatory constraints, and labour was becoming more widely available under the labour contract system. Taking the decision to push reforms one step further, the government embarked on a risky and controversial course of price reform-permitting commodity prices to respond to market forces instead of state planning mandates 26 . This meant that while there was little adjustment in the output quotas demanded of state enterprises, production inputs were subject to ever-increasing prices. The dilemmas for enterprise brought on by the problem of price spiralling often resulted in reduced benefits to industrial workers. For those workers formally attached to state enterprises, this meant that bonuses were cut back or eliminated, forced purchasing of state bonds was enforced, upgrading of worker facilities was postponed or cancelled, and general working conditions declined 27 . While much attention was focused on the role of unemployed itinerant workers in the demonstrations, factory workers formally attached to state enterprises were also extremely active.
For contract workers, the results of price reform were two-fold. In many cases labour contracts were cancelled or not renewed-thus rendering large numbers of workers unemployed. Yet these workers were often unable to return to the rural villages from whence they had come : these areas had adjusted to the migrant labourers' absence, there was no work for them to do and moreover their families remained dependent on their remissions of money from the cities. The result was increasing numbers of unemployed labourers wandering the streets of major cities in search of work. A second consequence was that when short term labour contracts were available, the terms were even more unfavourable that had been the case previously. In the employers' market that dominated at the time, itinerant labourers had little bargaining power and the inflation resulting from price reform was reducing the ability of employers to offer generous compensation and benefits under these labour contracts. The participation of urban workers in the democracy demonstrations of Spring 1989 provided ample testimony to the extent of dissatisfaction.
The Chinese government's response was indicative of its concern over worker unrest. A vigorous campaign was launched of discipline and control over urban workers that saw public executions of workers accused of participating in the democracy demonstrations dominate the Chinese public media throughout much of 1989. Indeed, the harshest punishments were reserved for worker demonstrators, particularly in comparison to the relatively lenient treatment of intellectuals and students. Repression was also directed at attempts to form independent labour unions, as labour organizers such as Han Dongfang were arrested and harassed 28 .
Privatization and the Socialist Market Economy
A third stage of reform has emerged following Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour (Nanxun) in 1992. Responding to Deng's call for accelerated and expanded economic reform, increased attention has been paid to privatization of Chinese enterprises. While debate continues over the extent of true privatization in the Chinese economy-particularly in light of the evidence that many so-called private enterprises are in fact owned and operated by local government agencies-, it is clear that the structure of enterprise control has changed 29 . Transformation of state enterprises through securitization has been accompanied by policies approving expansion of the village and township enterprise sector and the development of private enterprises limited by shares in urban areas 30 . Enterprises now respond to the local interests of corporatist elites who embody both the economic determinism of business managers with the political power of Party cadres. Along with local corporatism has come greater attention to efficiency and reduced production costs, which in turn has contributed to continued declines in labour conditions for industrial workers 31 . In response to these concerns, the Chinese government has re-emphasized long-standing regulations on worker health and safety, and in some instances issued new regulations 32 . In addition, new rules have been enacted governing reporting on worker accidents and injuries, in the hope that increased reporting requirements would induce greater compliance with health and safety regulations 33 .
Unfortunately, enforcement of these regulations has been problematic and as a result increased worker unrest has become a major challenge for Chinese labour policy. Between 1986 and 1994,60,000 labour disputes were recorded (probably matched by a sizeable number of unreported disputes), and 3,000 labour disputes were noted during first three months of 1994 alone 34 . The upsurge of labour disputes has been accompanied by renewed attempts to establish autonomous workers federations : e.g. the Beijing Workers Autonomous Federation and the China Workers Autonomous Federation 35 . While these events have been dismissed by the PRC Labour Ministry as an « inevitable » component of economic modernization, the matter is clearly a source of concern-particularly in light of the Tiananmen experience 36 .
The Chinese government's labour policies are caught in a dilemma of conflicting imperatives. Economic reform and the privatization (or at least corporatization) of production enterprises would appear to justify granting greater rights to workers in the areas of collective bargaining, work stoppages, and so on. Yet the regime also faces the need for continued economic growth, which mandates greater control over worker discipline even as it permits declining conditions of employment. The PRC Labour Law represents the regime's effort to address these issues. 
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An Overview of China's New Labour Law
The Labour Law of the PRC was enacted at the 8th session of the Standing Committee of the 8th National People's Congress July 5,1994, and went into effect January 1,1995 37 . The law went through a tortuous drafting process, involving thirty drafts since Deng Xiaoping first proposed drafting such a law during a 1978 central work conference 38 . While the delay revealed the extent to which managing labour relations is an essential basis for the distribution of patronage within China's hierarchical and vertically integrated administrative systems, the enactment of the legislation revealed the extent of consensus that workers presented a fundamental source of tension in the course of the transition from the planned to the market economy. The final draft was pushed through in response to obvious challenges resulting form changing ownership conditions of enterprises 39 . While private enterprises and foreign invested enterprises were the primary source of concern initially 40 , state-owned and cooperative enterprises are also targeted 41 .
Basic Principles
The PRC Labour Law extends a number of specific benefits to workers. These include « guarantees » respecting equal opportunity in employment, job selection, compensation, rest, leave, safety and health care, vocational training, social security and welfare, and the right to submit disputes to arbitration. Hiring units are required to fulfill various labour requirements in the areas of hours of employment, rest, leave, worker safety, health care and protection for female and juvenile workers. Juxtaposed to these benefits are a number of obligations that workers must honour, including the duties to fulfill work requirements, improve vocational skills, carry out work safety and health regulations, observe labour discipline and vocational ethics. The law also contains various enforcement provisions, by which local Labour Administration Departments are charged with supervision and inspection of labour relations. Subject to these broad principles, the new Labour Law contains a multitude of specific provisions as summarized below. A range of implementing regulations are currently being drafted to address these matters in greater detail.
1. Labour Contract System : Following the 1978 economic reforms, the labour contract system has undergone a rebirth. The Labour Law provides rules for contract provisions on term and description of employment, labour protection, remuneration, discipline, termination, liability for breach and limits to the use of probationary work periods during which benefits may be limited.
Limits to Working Hours and Overtime :
Overtime pay is required for work in excess of eight hours per day and 44 hours per week. One day per week is guaranteed for rest. Approval may be obtained for alternative arrangements.
3. Wages : The Labour Law establishes a principle of equal pay for equal work. This is intended to bring about greater gender equality in employment 42 . The state-mandated minimum wage must be taken as base pay. Factors to be considered in setting the state-mandated minimum wage include cost of living, the average wages being paid in the locality, productivity levels, and regional variations.
4. Social Insurance System : Employers must provide for benefit payments in cases of retirement, illness or injury, incapacity, unemployment, child birth, and so on.
Labour Disputes :
The Labour Law provides institutional rules for resolving conflicts arising during the course of (a) contract drafting (administrative resolution of the dispute by the local Labour Administration Department) ; (b) contract enforcement (resolution by an arbitration commission comprised of representatives from the local Labour Administration Department, the trade union, and the employer) ; and (c) disputes between employers and employees generally (resolution through a mediation by a commission comprised of representatives of staff and workers, the employer, and the local trade union, or arbitration by a commission comprised of representatives of the local Labour Administration Department, the trade union and the employer). Arbitral decisions may be appealed to the courts. Of the basic issues discussed above, the labour contract system and the dispute resolution provisions are of particular importance and will be discussed in greater detail below.
The Return to the Labour Contract System
With the post-Mao economic reform policies beginning in 1978, the labour contract system that had been used during the 1950s was revitalized. After the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) approved the use of the labour contract system in State-owned enterprises in April 1979, the labour contract system was increasingly seen as a positive mechanism for improving labour conditions and enterprise efficiency . While the contract system is intended to bring greater discipline and control to enterprises in managing labour relations, to a certain extent, the new Labour Law maintains the systems of patronage and coaptation that characterized the Maoist system. Thus, where a Shanghai worker voluntarily sought cancellation of a labour contract in order to take a job at another factory, the original employer was expected still to provide severance pay While labour unions can of course play a positive role in achieving better working conditions and other benefits, the record of the ACFTU system is somewhat problematic. The ACFTU's primary role as a guarantor of Party power and a « transmission belt » for Party policies undermines its capacity for independent action. And since all local trade unions are subject under law to the overall authority of the ACFTU, there is no legal sanction for the creation of independent labour unions that might challenge the Communist Party's official policies 57 . In addition, recent case reports suggest that the temptation to draw on worker dues for improper purposes may be overwhelming-raising again concerns that workers' interests are not particularly high matters of concern for union officials 58 . 
Dispute Resolution
The Labour Law's provisions on dispute resolution may offer workers a basis for appealing or perhaps avoiding altogether arbitrary decisions by management. In one case, for example, workers were accused of stealing electrical equipment and arbitrarily docked in pay-the public security officials being only too willing to enforce management orders with little if any investigation 59 . In another case, a worker was summarily suspended for three days without pay after getting into an argument with a supervisor 60 . The supervisor's superiors backed the suspension and the (reportedly innocent) worker was left without a remedy. Similar incidents have been reported at other enterprises 61 . The hope is that implementation of the Labour Law will impose more formalized processes for investigation and dispute resolution. The primary methods for resolving disputes included mediation, which is to be used through the whole process of handling labour disputes. According to the Labour Law, mediation should be based on the voluntariness of both parties. Both the process and content of dispute resolution should be in accordance with the law and follow the principle of fairness. 
